Ethnic Governance: What Western Media Got Wrong About Xinjiang
A deep dive into Xinjiang's history and China's governance strategies refute popular stigmas but possibly reveal a more diabolical truth.
On June 11th, 2021, Megha Rajagopalan of Buzzfeed News was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting for her series of reporting on China’s Uyghur detention camps in Xinjiang. Her five-part series focuses on the vast infrastructure constructed by the Chinese government in order to detain targeted “Muslim minorities,” mainly ethnic Uyghurs, and to subject them to forced labor under the guise of re-educating extremists. The methodology used by Rajagopalan to compile these reports focused on cross-referencing satellite images over Xinjiang of the detention camps as well as taking first-hand interviews from detained Uyghur victims. Though the work is undoubtedly an impressive piece of investigative journalism, these reports only highlight a partial truth within the broad issue of ethnic relations within China. Unfortunately, they have set the tone for all major Western media reports on the topic to be equally monotonous repetitions providing a surface-level laundry list of the Chinese government’s human rights violations. The core narrative taken on by mainstream international media is a firestorm of shallow and generalized criticism towards the Chinese government’s actions for being Islamophobic and racist.
Western reports on Xinjiang are rife with language often used to characterize Islamophobia in America and Europe, with critics now dubbing the predicament as an organized genocide against Uyghurs driven by anti-Islamic sentiments. Though these claims are not necessarily untrue altogether, they frame the Uyghur issue in a particular light meant to demonize not only the Chinese government, but also portray the modern Han Chinese people as colonizers similar to the British or French of the 19th century. However, the problem with this narrative is its tendency to mislead a detached, Western audience due to oversight of complex, racial dynamics within China. As a result, this narrative unwittingly wedges China’s unique ethnoreligious woes into the ill-fitted frame of the West’s own struggle with Islamophobia as well as playing into rising antagonism towards China in the West.
Historical Roots
To begin with, Buzzfeed’s first article on this matter claims that “the position of Muslim minorities, particularly Uighurs, in China has been fraught since the Communist Party came to power in 1949.” Though the statement itself is true at face value, it is nonetheless highly misleading, implying that anti-Islamic sentiments and racism against Uyghurs, which are equated to the same type of anti-Islamic sentiments present in The US and Europe, began with the Communist takeover of 1949. This statement encourages uninformed readers to conjure up the image of an independent “Uyghur nation” prior to 1949 and Chinese rule.
Yet anyone well-versed in Chinese history will point out that this implication is far from the truth. The region which we currently refer to as “Xinjiang (新疆)” is an area historically contested by multiple political and ethnic groups, including but not limited to Mongolians, Uyghurs, Russians, Han Chinese, and Manchurians. The final of these five groups, under the Manchurian dynasty of Qing China (1644-1912), captured Xinjiang from the Mongolian Dzungar Khanate in 1759. Manchu brutality towards Oirat Mongolians and Uyghurs during Qing rule of Xinjiang is indeed of historical record. Muslim-led rebellions broke out in Xinjiang on multiple occasions, the most notable of which are Jahangir Khoja’s rebellion in the 1820s and the Hui Minorities Revolt (alternatively, the Dungan Rebellion) in the 1860s.
As previously mentioned, much of Western media’s criticisms has been focused on Islamophobia, which happens to be a hot-button issue in the West. Hence, I highlight these two particular revolts because the key distinction between these two revolts reveal the shallowness of a Western narrative bent on lumping complicated ethnic relations into the umbrella term of “Islamophobia.” The former of the two revolts is a Uyghur-ledrevolt, while the latter is a Hui-ledrevolt. The Uyghurs are a specific ethnic group who traditionally inhabit the region of Xinjiang, distinct from the Hui people, who hail from much more mixed historical roots (descendants of Arabian merchants in China, multiple ethnic Turkic groups, early Han Chinese converts to Islam, etc.) and are geographically spread out in China. In fact, statistically speaking, a majority of Muslims in China are Hui and not Uyghur. Thus, to equate Xinjiang’s situation with Western Islamophobia—rooted in a long history of Christian hostility and competition with neighboring Muslim empires—reduces China’s ethnoreligious troubles into a convenient framework Euro-Americans are familiar with. In the case of the Uyghur detention camps, the Chinese government is more so targeting the ethnicity of Uyghur instead of the religion of Islam, so to talk of Uyghur detention camps and generalized Islamophobia in one breath is a gross oversimplification. (Note, this does not imply that discrimination against the Hui people is not present in China nor does this suggest that the Chinese government does not take issue with the religion of Islam, but this topic will be addressed in the next section.)
After the fall of the Qing Dynasty (1912), the entire region of North and Northwestern China, oftentimes referred to as China’s borderland regions, fell into disarray. Xinjiang in particular experienced violent Uyghur and Hui uprisings, northern Chinese warlordism, and invasion by the Soviet Union. It was also during this period that Uyghur nationalism swept the population of Xinjiang, resulting in the proclamation of a short-lived First East Turkestan Republic. Arguably, prior to the early 20th century, the region of Xinjiang (and in fact the adjacent regions of modern day Mongolia and Tibet) was an area of harsh climates shared by a colorful array of mainly nomadic ethnic groups, including but not limited to multiple peoples Turkic or Mongolian in origin. The loose rule of multiple Khanates, nomadism, and merchant trade characterized the region prior to the sweep of nationalism, which pushed local groups to undergo ethnogenesis and attempt to stake historical claims on a piece of land which previously “belonged” to no one group in particular.
“Colonialism” and “Genocide”
In addition to reductionist Euro-American claims relegating Uyghur detention camps to simple Islamophobia, the Western media has also used words such as “colonialism” and “genocide” to describe the Chinese government’s treatment of Uyghurs. I take issue with the usage of both these terms, mainly because they are once again both only partial truths. To understand the nuances within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s treatment of Uyghurs and non-Han ethnic minorities, we must delve into racial dynamics and political beliefs in China today as well as the CCP’s strategies towards governance at large.
Firstly, the term “colonialism” as used in Buzzfeed News’s coverage of Uyghur detention camps implies perceived racial superiority to justify the subjugation of a lesser people harkening back to Western ideas of the so-called “white man’s burden.” While the methods used by the CCP in governing and subjugating ethnic minorities in China unquestionably resemble those used in Western colonization, the reasons for this subjugation is not exactly the same. As covered in the previous section, multiple groups stake a historical claim upon the region of Xinjiang, including, of course, the People’s Republic of China. In fact, after the fall of the Qing Dynasty, China has never recognized the Uyghur and Turkic uprisings in Xinjiang as anything other than temporary breakaways, and this sentiment is consistent throughout the reigns of both the Republic of China (1912-1949; currently, the government of Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China (1949-present). The idea of a unified China--originating in China’s nationalistic intellectual movement of the late 19th and early 20th century--includes its northern borderland regions of Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang. This idea far predated 1949, unlike what Buzzfeed’s article may suggest. China under the CCP reconquered the region of Xinjiang in 1949 because it was perceived as a retaking of a breakaway province, which is the same reason the CCP still plans to reclaim Taiwan today.
Meanwhile, Han-centrism actually predates this idea of a unified China by several thousand years, since the Han have been portraying “borderland peoples” as uncivilized and barbaric long before the seeds of Western nationalism influenced the thought politics of China. In fact, traditional Han-centrism often wanted little to do with the borderlands in terms of governance, as these lands were seen as undesirable with little arable land and overrun by uncivilized, violent peoples. It was not until the conquering of these regions by the Manchurian Qing and the subsequent birth of Chinese nationalism in the early 1900s that this idea was popularized. Thus, although Han-centrism and feelings of racial superiority is inevitably still present in China today, the core political justification for reconquering Xinjiang has little to do with racial dominance and more to do with the goal of reunifying what Han nationalists view as lands rightfully belonging to China.
The second term Western media has used in a rather careless manner regarding the Uyghur detention camps is that of “genocide.” For this particular term to stick, there would have to be intent by the Chinese government to eradicate the Uyghur ethnicity completely, similar to Hitler’s infamous Final Solution. However, there is little evidence of an attempt to actually cull the Uyghur population en masse, but rather a cruel and iron-fisted attempt to re-education and Sinicize Uyghurs into manageable citizens. Western media accuses the CCP of violating the freedom of religion and putting Uyghurs under indentured servitude. However, one must consider the fact that forced labor and religious subjugation are all just part and parcel of classic CCP methods in managing its citizens. In fact, forced labor is par for the course in Chinese prisons today, and all religious organizations operating in China are more or less legally required to be under direct CCP control, including the religions favored by Han Chinese like Buddhism and Daoism. So, in actuality, the single defining feature of the Uyghur detention camps is that they are specifically targeted towards an entire ethnic group. Combined with classic methods of CCP control like forced labor, re-education, and religious subjugation, it becomes comparable to colonialist attempts at “ethnic cleansing.” However, as we will see in the next section, the Uyghur detention camps are the product of the CCP’s own failures in ethnic governance. “Ethnic cleansing” was never the initial intent when the CCP retook Xinjiang in 1949, and nor did it become a part of the CCP’s plans until fairly recently.
So how did things escalate to the point where the CCP felt it was necessary to eradicate the Uyghurs’ racial identity? The answer is, as always, multifaceted, and in part due to the CCP’s own struggles to maintain control over its culturally-diverse population.
Divisive Policies and Governing Ethnicities
It may surprise many that in the decades prior to Xi Jinping’s presidency, the CCP’s official rhetoric on China’s ethnic minorities is that they should be culturally celebrated whilst being incorporated into the nation of China. This is what Chinese children are taught starting from elementary school, and in theory, this promise of cultural celebration continues today, though increased antagonism towards minorities is on the rise along with Han-centrism. In reality, this rhetoric was cleverly designed to achieve effective ethnic governance in a country as large and diverse as China, to maintain control over both ethnic minorities and the Han Chinese population.
The Communist government’s approach to governing ethnic minorities has always been the classic strategy of the carrot and the stick. The “stick” is by far the easiest to understand. Ethnic minorities are subjugated to stricter laws, forced to study a government-approved education program including Mandarin and CCP-approved history (standard nationwide), and are often discriminated against by local government officials. Any attempt at protest or uprising is promptly put down by force. The “carrot,” meanwhile, is an element of Chinese society not well-known abroad. A major pillar of the CCP’s appeasement policies comes in the form of the highly controversial affirmative action laws benefiting ethnic minorities, particularly in the area of education.
Education in China is unimaginably competitive, with only 62.71% of students passing entrance exams from middle school to high school and 81.79% of high school students passing into college in 2019. As college acceptance is based purely on points, the difference of one point can very much decide which schools a student gets accepted into. Thus, the fact that ethnic minorities in China get free bonus points to boost their college entrance exam scores is a matter of heated contention between Han Chinese citizens and ethnic minorities. In addition to this, ethnic minorities are not subject to the infamous one-child policy, do not have to pay taxes to the central government, and receive heavy government subsidies for local welfare. This is clearly a strategic move to “buy off” minority populations in exchange for political obedience. But Han Chinese citizens living under the lethal conditions of the Chinese job market are understandably unhappy with this perceived favoritism. All of these factors are compounded with the fact that political abuses towards ethnic minorities are practically unknown within the Han Chinese populace due to state control of the media. The result is that Han Chinese are generally unsympathetic and uninformed towards the plight of minorities such as Tibetans or Uyghurs.
The strategy the CCP uses to manage its Han and minority citizens hinges upon ensuring political obedience, creating a controlled rift between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities. As long as any ethnic group, Uyghur or otherwise, remained relatively obedient and accepting of government demands such as receiving a Mandarin education, they were free to reap the fruits of state-funded welfare and practice their own cultures and religions as long as it occurred under CCP control. Herein lies the precarious balance of the carrot and the stick strategy, which remained relatively effective throughout the eras of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao.
So why exactly did Xi Jinping’s government decide to suddenly crack down on Uyghurs? The answer is due, in large part, to the visibility of violent Uyghur-related incidents. The first incident of note are the riots of July 2009, where nearly 200 people, mostly Han Chinese, were killed during an ethnically-motivated bout of violence between Han Chinese and Uyghurs in the Xinjiang capital of Urumqi. Though the incident which triggered the riots was the death of two Uyghur workers killed in a brawl with Han Chinese, the impression these riots left in the minds of the Han populace at large was a violent and volatile Uyghur population which aligns with stereotypes of Uyghurs as barbaric. The second turning point is the infamous 2012 station stabbings, during which a group of Uyghurs initiated an attack in the Urumqi train station, killing 3 and injuring 79 with a combination of explosives and knife stabbings. After this 2012 incident, a number of Uyghur-initiated public stabbings followed. A wave of horror swept the nation as Uyghurs were framed as religious extremists and terrorists by official state media, which blamed Jihadists from the Middle East for infiltrating the ranks of China’s Uyghurs and breeding terrorism. Of course, the irony of this strategy is how smoothly the CCP used dominant international rhetoric about Islamic Jihadism and terrorism to scapegoat the ethnic grievances of Uyghurs in China.
Yet, as it turned out, to relegate these stabbings to Muslim Jihadism was only the first step. The visibility of these incidents had disrupted the general populace to an unacceptable level, with the Chinese government worrying that it may appear as if it had lost control over the Uyghurs in the eyes of the public. This insecurity, combined with the increase in government oversight and the rise of Han nationalism under Xi Jinping’s rule, resulted in the Uyghur detention camps.
The construction of these camps may appear to be a senseless act of persecution in the eyes of the foreign public, but from the perspective of CCP governance, it makes sense. The picture that we get from piecing together Xinjiang’s regional histories and the CCP’s strategy of ethnic governance is a multi-ethnic nation crippled under a regime bent on maintaining tight control of all of its citizens at any price. The CCP is not motivated by pure Islamophobia or the spirit of 19th century colonialism, but rather a strategic management of its own population. By exacerbating ethnic divisions and promoting Han-centrism, the CCP keeps its citizens divided, obedient, and easily governable. Though there are definitely elements of colonialism in the way the CCP treats its ethnic minorities, the general strategy used by the CCP to create obedience and maintain control is applied to of its population as a whole—Han, Uyghur, or otherwise. In addition, the main reason for an ethnic crackdown on Uyghurs is not so much Islamophobia or even racism, but rather to crush perceived opposition and preserve the CCP’s image of absolute control. Thus, when these factors are taken into account, the Western media’s criticism appear a shallow and misleading portrayal of its own insecurities surrounding Islamophobia and racism, which it attempts to project upon the “enemy” nation of China.
To further decolonize our minds, check out my sources for this piece:
Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest by Justin V. Hastings
China Secretly Built a Vast Infrastructure to Imprison Uighurs by Megha Rajagopalan
Eurasian Crossroads: a History of Xinjiang by James A. Millward
The Uyghur Conflict in Chinese Xinjiang by Kunal Mukherjee
Xinjiang station attack: President Xi Jinping urges action from BBC News
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